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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
J. ,V. EDGAR, a/k/a JIM EDGAR 
and EVELYN EDGAR, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents_, 
vs. Civil No. 10159 
COMBINED PRODUCTION AS-
SOCIATES, LTD., A Utah Corpo-
ration 
' Defendant and A. ppellant. 
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Appeal from a Judgment of the District Court of 
Salt Lake CountyF I 
Honorable A. H. Ellett, dge L E D 
Sfpg - 1964 
-~--ci~-;rs-~;~;;;---c------------
H.G.METOS 
404 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Appellant 
ourt, Ut~h--..., 
KIRTON & BETTILYON 
VERDEN E. BETTILYON 
336 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Respondents 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
.J. \V. EDG1\R, alk/a JIM EDGAR 
and E Y"l~~L YN EDGAR, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents~ 
vs. 
CO~llllNED PRODUCTION AS-
SOCLATES, LTD., A Utah Corpo-
ratiOit, J)cj'cndant and Appellant. 
Civil No. 
10159 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
S'LATEl\IENT OF THE l(IND OF CASE 
This is an action to collect $9,000.00 on a contract. 
DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT 
This case was tried to the court at a pre-trial hear-
ing. Fr01n the summary judgment for the plaintiffs, 
defendant appeals. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment in favor 
of the plaintiffs and seeks judgment in its favor as a 
matter of law, or that failing, a trial. 
STATEMENT OF F'ACTS 
The Plaintiffs' were the owners of a one-quarter 
interest in mining claims, known as Blue Star, Blue 
Star No. 1 and Blue Star No. 2, located in Eureka 
County, Nevada. In 1959, Plaintiffs and the other 
owners leased the claims and by mesne assignments, 
the Lease came into the possession of the Defendant, 
Combined Production Associates, Ltd. 
On December 9, 1962, Mr. A. B. Thomas, Presi-
dent of Defendant Corporation, met with the Plaintiffs 
and asked them to sign an Amendment to this ~ease. 
This document was entitled "Amendment to Mining 
Lease & Options," and shall hereafter be referred to as 
"Amendment." Plaintiffs refused to sign the Amend-
ment because it placed obligations on them that they 
did not have under the original Lease. Mr. Thomas 
then offered Plaintiffs $10,000 for their one-quarter 
interest in the Blue Star Mining Claims, payable 
$1,000.00 by check and $9,000.00 by note of Combined 
ProductionAssociates, Ltd.,personally endorsed byhim, 
payable on June 15, 1963. As evidence of this agree-
ment, Mr. A. B. Thomas wrote out the memo which 
is attached to Plaintiffs' Complaint as Exhibit "A" 
(R 2-a). The Plaintiffs were still dissatisfied with the 
4 
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arrangement. because the Amendment still required 
the Plaintiffs and other Lessors to agree upon the 
loeation of the mining claims. Therefore, in order to 
satisfy this requirement, Mr. Thomas added the para-
graph that appears on the bottom of the memo (Ex-
hibit "A''). This satisfied the Plaintiffs and they ac-
cepted the check from Mr. Thomas. It was further 
agreed by the parties at that time that one other person 
by the name of Travis Edgar had to sign the plat, 
agreeing to the location of the claims and as soon as 
that was done, the agreement was to go into effect. A 
few days later, the Plaintiffs received the telegram 
(R .t<l), as follows: 
"Thanks for everything. Morris leaves this 
afternoon for Albuquerque. Check and note will 
be good the minute Travis signs, which should 
be tomorrow. Will work hard for a payout to 
you before June 15th. Regards. Combined Pro-
duction Associates, A. B. Thomas." 
Then on December 15th, another telegram (R 42) 
was received by the Plaintiffs, as follows: 
''Travis has signed. Deposit check. Note will 
reach you in a few days." 
The note never arrived and on June 15, 1963, the 
date the balance of the $9,000.00 became due, Plaintiffs 
made demand upon Thomas for payment, which was 
refused and this action was started. Thereafter, Com-
bined Production Associates, Ltd., sold a one-half 
interest in the Lease to Sierra de Oro, a Nevada Cor-
poration (R 30 to 33). 
5 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. THE COURT ERRED IN GRANT-
ING THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST 
THE DEFENDANT. 
The simple handwritten agreement, together with 
the two telegrams, sets forth a clear, intelligible con-
tract between the parties. The contract was contingent 
upon the signing of a document by Travis Edgar, but 
the telegram clearly recites that "Travis has signed" 
and that the agreement went into effect. The agree-
ment of the parties is simply set out as follows: If 
the Plaintiffs would sign the Amendment to the Lease 
which was presented to them, Defendant agreed to buy 
their one-quarter interest in the claims from the Plain-
tiffs for $10,000.00, payable $1,000.00 cash and the 
balance on June 15, 1963. The whole arrangement was 
contingent upon Travis Edgar signing and the tele-
gram clearly states that Travis had signed. Therefore, 
there was immediately a binding and enforceable agree-
ment. 
POINT 2. THAT PLAINTIFFS' CAUSE OF 
r 
ACTION IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF 
FRAUDS AND UNENFORCEABLE F 0 R 
LACK OF MUTUALITY. 
There is more to this action than a simple sale of 
the claims: The Plaintiffs executed an Amendment, as 
requested by the President of the Defendant Corpora-
tion. This new Amendment placed burdens upon the 
6 
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I .essors that they had not previously had, so the con-
sideration for the sale \vas two-fold: ( 1) The signing 
of the i \ mewlment, and ( :Z) $10,000.00 represented by 
$1.000.00 in cash and the balance to be by a promissory 
note. 
Except for the conveyance of the mining leases, the 
l >lain tiffs had complied with the terms of the agree-
ment, and this was certainly a sufficient performance 
to take the contract out of the Statute of Frauds. 
It has long been recognized that part performance 
of a parol contract for the sale of real estate has the 
effect of taking such contract from the operation of 
the Statute of Frauds, so that equity may decree its 
specific performance or grant other equitable relief. 
The basis for this doctrine is set out in 49 Am J ur 421 
(paragraph :t21) : 
''The true basis of the doctrine of part per-
fonnance, according to the overwhelming weight 
of authority, is that it would be a fraud upon the 
plaintiff if the defendant were permitted to 
escape perf orn1ance of his part of the oral agree-
Inent after he has permitted the plaintiff to per-
form in reliance upon the agreement. The oral 
contract is enforced in harmony with the prin-
ciple that courts of equity will not allow the 
statute of frauds to be used as an instrument 
of fraud. In other words, the doctrine of part 
performance was established for the same pur-
pose for which the statute of frauds itself was 
enacted, namely, for the prevention of fraud, 
and arose from the necessity of preventing the 
statute from becoming an agent of fraud, for it 
7 
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could not have been the intention of the statute 
to enable any party to commit a fraud with im-
punity.'' 
Utah has recognized this doctrine and the rule as 
set out in re Madsen's Estate, 259 P.2d 595 (at page 
601): 
"This Court has adopted and followed the 
general rule laid down by Besse v. McHenry, 
89 Mont. 520, 300 P. 199, which states: "Part 
performance which will avoid statute of frauds 
may consist of any act which puts party per-
forming in such position that nonperformance 
by other would constitute fraud." 
(See cases cited therein) . 
Since the Plaintiffs have now signed the Amend-
ment to the Lease, which Lease has been negotiated 
to the Corporation, Sierra de Oro (R 30-33), Plain-
tiffs are precluded from suing for rescission of the con-
tract, since the rights of innocent third parties have 
intervened. Therefore, if the Defendant were allowed 
to set up the defense of the Statute of Frauds, then 
the very thing the Statute tries to guard against would 
occur-a fraud would be perpetrated on Plaintiffs. They 
have signed the Amendment and it cannot now be 
rescinded. 
Defendant has set out as a defense that there was 
no mutuality of remedy. This Court has long recog-
nized the principle that where one person has perforn1ed 
under the contract, the fact that the other person may 
not have been able to require performance is no defense 
8 
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to the action. ln Utah _jlercur Gold Min. Co. v. Her-
schel (~old 1\lin. Co., 134 P.2d 1094 (at page 1097), 
this Court said: 
.. Hespondents contend the prayer if granted 
would in effect require specific performance in 
that plaintiffs would be put in possession with 
leave to continue development. They contend 
that the principle of mutuality of remedy pre-
yeuts the court from granting specific perform-
ance because if the plaintiffs had refused to go 
on with the agreed development the court could 
not compel them to do so. We see no merit in 
the co'urt refusing to grant performance to a 
petitioner where he has performed his part simply 
because the respondent might not or could not 
obtain specific performance if the shoe had been 
on the other foot.'-' (Emphasis added). 
In Genola Town v. Santaquin City, 96 Utah 
88 ,80 P.2d 930, 934, we said "The old doctrine 
of n1utuality of remedy is a concrete example of 
a rule which has been so eroded by necessary 
exceptions as to leave it more of a vestige than 
a substantiality." It is very difficult to see why 
a person who refuses to perform where the other 
has performed may stand up in court and say: 
"Even though he has done what the contract 
required of him and I have not, you should not 
1nake me perform because if he had not per-
formed and I had not performed or tendered 
performance I could not obtain the remedy of 
specific performance." The remedy of one should 
not depend upon the hypothetical case of what 
another could demand if the situation were differ-
ent." 
() 
./ 
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POINT 3. THAT PLAINTIFFS FAILED 
TO TENDER A DEED TO THE CLAIMS OR 
SHOW OWNERSHIP OF THE CLAil\1S AT 
THE TIME OF THE HEARING. 
The Defendant Corporation has been in possession 
of the claims under the Lease and has been operating 
them for a long period of time; therefore, was in a better 
position to know the status of the title than were the 
Plaintiffs themselves. It was for this reason that the 
paragraph on the bottom of the agreement was added, 
relating to the acceptance of the position of the claims. 
Also, the Vendors under a contract cannot be obligated 
to assume any greater responsibility than is contained 
within their contract. The contract does not contain 
any requirement as to the warranty of the claims; only 
the statement that they were to "assign" the Blue Star 
interest (R 2-a). If the Defendant had desired any 
warranty as to the title, it certainly would have added 
that to the document. Having failed to make that re-
quirement, it cannot now insist upon anything further 
than a conveyance of, whatever interest the Plaintiffs 
may have in and to the claims. 
Since Defendant is in possession of the property, 
is it now estopped to deny the Plaintiffs' title. At 55 
Am Jur 800 (paragraph 375), the rule is stated as 
follows: 
"It is a universally recognized rule that no one 
who has entered into the possession of land under 
an executory contract of sale is estopped from 
denying or questioning his vendor's title for the 
10 
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purpose of defeating the agreement or the rights 
of the Yendor thereunder. The principle upon 
whieh the rule rests is that the purchaser is 
estopped to deny the title of the vendor, because 
he acknow I edged it and gained possession by his 
purchase, and he ought not then in conscience, 
as between them, be allowed to enjoy the fruits 
of his contract and not pay the full considera-
tion." 
\Vith regard to the requirement of a tender, there 
hus never been any hesitation on the part of the Plain-
tiffs to Inake a deed of the claims available to the De-
fendant, at such time as the balance of the purchase 
price was paid. The Plaintiffs will now stipulate with 
the Defendant that a deed to the claims may be delivered 
to the Clerk of the Court, to be delivered to the De-
fendant upon payment of the $9,000.00, plus interest 
and costs. But certainly, equity does not require that 
a deed be delivered merely because a Judgment has 
been entered, since there is no assurance that a J udg-
ment can be or will be collectible against the Defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
The J udgn1ent against Defendant, Combined Pro-
duction ..tissociates, Ltd., should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIRTON & BETTILYON 
Y" erden E. Bettilyon 
336 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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